Human Reasoning & Naturalism

“All possible knowledge. . .depends on the validity of reasoning. If the feeling of certainty which we express by words like must be and therefore and since is a real perception of how things outside of our own minds really “must” be, well and good. But if this certainty is merely a feeling in our minds and not genuine insight into realities beyond them – if it merely represents the ways our minds happen to work – then we have no knowledge. Unless human reasoning is valid no science can be true.” – C.S. Lewis

5 responses to “Human Reasoning & Naturalism

  1. Aha! Good one. Might have to use that sometime. Unless human reasoning is valid, no science can be true.

    Guess we all need to work on our reasoning and how we have come to conclusions as well as why.

    After all, we were given minds to be able to reason. Unfortunately our minds get fogged up with alot of darkness and gook.

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  2. If I am just a conglomeration of randomly acquired senses, then there is no reason to think that there are not a great deal of sensory datum which I cannot receive.

    But even in the receiving, sentience is dependent on perspective, that is, the subject needs an object. How can we assert that we grasp this?

    It makes Hume’s issue with miracles a self consumptive proposition, asserting universals of perception and abstract concepts from a point of view that cannot be said to be anything but a slave to itself.

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  3. Nice to see you Jason,

    My very limited understanding of Hume include this: “his conclusion is not that miracles do not happen. Rather, his conclusion is that no evidence is sufficient to establish that a miracle has occurred, that even if a miracle has occurred we ought not to believe in it.

    If that is an accurate description of Hume, “slave to itself” is an excellent description.

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